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Appropriative Water Rights and the 
Efficient Allocation of Resources 
By H. STUART BURNESS AND JAMES P. QUIRK* 
Historically, water rights to surface 
water in the United States have developed 
under two distinct legal doctrines-the 
English common law notion of riparian 
rights and the appropriative doctrine. Gen- 
erally speaking, the riparian doctrine forms 
the basis for water law in the eastern states, 
while the western states have adopted the 
appropriative doctrine. Under the riparian 
doctrine, each property owner fronting on 
a lake or stream has a right to the unim- 
paired use of the waterway, regardless of 
the location of his property along the water- 
way and regardless of the time at which the 
property is acquired or use made of the 
waterway. Consequently, rights to water 
are only usufructuary: strictly speaking the 
right holder may not diminish the flow of 
water by physically consuming it as this 
would impair the rights of other riparians. 
In practice the courts have held that 
"reasonable" diversions of water by ri- 
parian rights holders are permissible, but 
there are still severe restrictions on such 
diversions, coupled with uncertainty as to 
how a court will view any specific diver- 
sion. As a practical matter, the riparian 
doctrine is especially suited to an environ- 
ment in which the use of water involves no 
diversions, for example, in the use of a 
stream for fishing, swimming, boating, 
transportation, or power generation. 
In contrast, under the appropriative 
doctrine the right to a certain amount of 
water is established and maintained only 
through use; if there is a lapse in usage or a 
change in the nature of the usage, the right 
to the water can be lost.' Moreover, the 
right enables the holder to physically con- 
sume the water to which he is entitled, pro- 
vided it is put to a beneficial use. Seniority 
of rights is based on the chronological order 
in which the right was obtained, the earliest 
user of water along a waterway being the 
most senior rights holder with priorities 
superior to those of junior rights holders. 
Under the appropriative doctrine, "first in 
time means first in right." 
The appropriative doctrine was adopted 
in the West (and is spreading to eastern 
states as well) because it is well suited to 
the exploitation of a waterway under con- 
ditions in which the major uses of the 
waterway involve physical diversions of 
water, say for irrigation or for municipal 
or industrial uses. There are obvious advan- 
tages under such circumstances to a system 
of rights based on the appropriative doc- 
trine, as discussed in the authors (1976); 
Charles Meyers; Jerome Milliman. In par- 
ticular, an allocation of rights based on the 
appropriative doctrine preserves incentives 
for investment that would be foregone 
under the riparian scheme because of the 
common property characteristics of water 
under riparian allocation of rights. 
This is not to say that the appropriative 
doctrine is without drawbacks from the 
point of view of economic efficiency. For 
example, inefficiencies can arise under the 
appropriative doctrine when an individual 
diverts more water than he can presently 
use profitably in order to establish a right 
to the use of such water in the future when 
the use might be profitable. To protect 
against this, state water laws limit appro- *University of New Mexico and California Institute 
of Technology, respectively. This research was con- 
ducted at the Environmental Quality Laboratory at 
Caltech and was supported in part under a grant from 
the Energy Research and Development Administra- 
tion, No. EX-76-G-03-1305, Caltech Energy Research 
Program. 
1 For a discussion of the legal principles involved un- 
der the riparian and appropriative doctrines, see 
Richard Dewsnut and Dallice Jensen. 
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priative rights to diversions that qualify as 
"beneficial consumptive use," thus exclud- 
ing wasteful types or methods of water use. 
But there are obvious difficulties in estab- 
lishing that water is being wasted by a 
rights holder, so that the protection af- 
forded by the restriction of appropriations 
to beneficial consumptive use might be 
more illusory than real.2 
Most of the allocative problems associ- 
ated with the appropriative doctrine would 
be eliminated if water rights could be freely 
transferred or sold. But in every state op- 
erating under the appropriative doctrine, 
there are limitations on the transfer and 
sale of water rights. The statutes apply with 
most force to transfers that involve a 
change in use or in diversion location, as, 
for example, in the transfer of a water right 
from irrigation to industrial or power use, 
or in the transfer of water outside the 
property limits of the original rights 
holder.3 Moreover, even when restrictions 
on intrastate transfers are relatively weak, 
sale or transfer of a water right that in- 
volves removal of water to another state is 
a practical impossibility, at least in the 
western states. 
Independent of these statutory restric- 
tions the appropriative doctrine provides 
an interesting scenario for the analysis of 
the efficiency aspects of water allocation. 
In this paper, we examine the efficiency 
implications of the appropriative doctrine 
at a long-run competitive equilibrium under 
simplified assumptions as to the legal status 
of water rights.4 Briefly, our conclusions are 
the following. In the absence of a competi- 
tive market for the purchase and sale of 
water rights, the appropriative doctrine 
leads to an inefficient use of water. Ineffi- 
ciency arises under the appropriative doc- 
trine because of the unequal sharing of 
risks among the users of a waterway; senior 
appropriators bear less risk than junior 
appropriators. As an application of the 
Coase theorem, the introduction of a com- 
petitive market in water rights and use of 
diversion facilities eliminates allocative 
inefficiencies. However, increasing returns 
in the construction and maintenance of 
diversion facilities interferes with the estab- 
lishment of competitive markets in the 
leasing of diversion capacity; furthermore, 
monopoly problems can arise in the market 
for water rights as well. Beyond this, limi- 
tations on entry can lead to problems asso- 
ciated with a suboptimal investment in 
diversion capacity. 
For the special case of a waterway util- 
ized by firms with identical production 
functions, allocative efficiency requires the 
equal sharing of risk (hence water) by all 
firms. But an assignment of water rights on 
the basis of equal sharing (a variant of the 
legal doctrine of correlative rights) leads to 2Meyers and A. Dan Tarlock cite a case in which 
use of water during the off-season to flood gophers 
from their holes was not deemed beneficial consump- 
tive use. Furthermore, some court decisions have 
specified maximum amounts of water usage per irri- 
gated acre that qualify as beneficial consumptive use. 
On the other hand, a large unnamed western irriga- 
tion district loses from 150,000 to 500,000 acre-feet of 
water yearly due to seepage in an unlined diversion 
canal, a method of use which could be considered 
wasteful. As this amount is included in its rights total, 
should it decide to line the canal, it could use the sal- 
vaged water. 
3For example, in 1974, the Metropolitan Water Dis- 
trict (MWD) of Southern California was able to trans- 
fer a portion of its rights to Colorado River water to 
the Southern California Edison Company, but only 
after the passage of enabling legislation by the Cali- 
fornia State Legislature, as Southern California Edison 
intended to use this water outside of the geographic 
limits of the MWD. 
4For example, many existing statutes allow for re- 
visions in priority in times of drought. As a con- 
sequence, junior domestic and municipal or industrial 
users might be satisfied prior to senior agricultural 
users although not without compensation. We ignore 
this complication in our analysis. The relevance of 
this point arises in conjunction with the recent western 
drought and the prediction of lower long-term water 
availability (for example, as suggested from the tree 
ring studies performed by the Lake Powell Research 
Group relative to the Colorado River). It is difficult to 
assess the importance of these matters, at least in the 
case of the Colorado River, as large accumulations of 
stored water and the Bureau of Reclamation's im- 
plicit policy of releasing enough water to satisfy all 
downstream users (which in total are limited to mean 
stream flow) suggest that it will be quite a while until 
such constraints become effective. We explore these 
questions to some extent in our 1977 paper. 
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much the same common property problems 
as the riparian scheme; and similar difficul- 
ties arise for the case of firms using diverse 
technologies. Thus, in the absence of freely 
transferrable property rights, the appro- 
priative doctrine leads to an allocation of 
water that is inefficient, but alternative 
schemes for assigning water rights are 
generally not incentive compatible with a 
competitive environment. 
I. The Model 
The problems that arise for an efficient 
allocation of water under the appropria- 
tive doctrine rest ultimately on the random 
nature of water flows. We consider the case 
of a waterway with a flow of x acre-feet 
per year, where x is a random variable with 
known probability density function f(x).5 
For simplicity, we ignore the autocorrela- 
tion of streamflows over time and concen- 
trate instead on the characteristics of a 
steady-state situation. We assume that there 
are a number of potential users of the 
stream and that no institutional barriers to 
entry exist, except those associated with the 
rights of senior appropriators. 
Under the appropriative doctrine, rights 
to water are established only through use. 
In order to use ai units of water each pe- 
riod, the ith appropriator must have ac- 
cess to a diversion facility with a capacity at 
least equal to ai units. In particular, firm i 
is assumed to possess a profit function 
7r'(ai,ai) where ai is the use of water per 
period by firm i and iii is the capacity of the 
diversion facility owned by firm i, subject 
to the restriction ai ' a-i. For simplicity we 
ignore other factors of production although 
clearly substitution of other factors for 
water could play an important role in the 
production process, particularly for firms 
with relatively junior rights. 
We assume that there is no charge to an 
appropriator for the water he uses,6 that 
7r I hri/Oai > 0, 0 < ai < ai, 7r1 = 0 
otherwise, and 
-xi, a27ril/aa < 0. Costs 
incurred in production are associated 
with the construction and maintenance 
of diversion facilities. It is clear that 
there are certain economies of scale as- 
sociated with facilities such as pipelines 
and aqueducts. We assume that such non- 
convexities apply for a certain range, after 
which problems of coordination, etc., 
overwhelm the natural economies of scale. 
In particular, we assume that = - ri/ 
aOi < 0, for ai > 0 ;22 _ o27i/ad > 0, for 
-ia < < 0 for di > a7. Moreover, in 
most of what follows we will assume that 
the profit-maximizing choices of diversion 
capacities occur in the range d!i > -V, so 
that the marginal cost of adding diversion 
capacity is increasing. Finally, it is con- 
venient to assume that diversion facilities 
deteriorate only through aging and not 
through use, so that _rXi2 - a 27r /iaida-i = 0. 
Under this assumption the profit function 
is separable in ai and ai, so that 7ri(ai, di) = 
Ri(ai) - C1(di), where RI and Ci are the 
revenue and cost functions for the ith firm. 
Our primary purpose is to identify the 
sources of allocative inefficiency associated 
with the appropriative doctrine. These 
sources are most easily identified in the 
simplest possible setting. Hence our ap- 
proach in the body of this paper is to ex- 
amine in detail the special case where all 
appropriators have identical profit func- 
tions, with each appropriator acting to 
maximize expected profits. Extensions of 
these results to cases of dissimilar or risk- 
averse firms are noted when of interest. 
With this as background we examine the 
long-run equilibrium of a waterway being 
exploited under the system of appropriative 
rights. We label rights holders in order of 
seniority, with firm 1 being the most senior 
rights holder, firm 2 second in seniority, 
etc. Clearly, in long-run equilibrium with 
5We assumef(x) > 0 for x > 0, f(x) = 0 for x < 0. 
Letting 
F(x) = fox f(c)dc 
we have F(O) = O and lim 
., F(x) = 1. 
6Generally, the presence of charges do not affect the 
results, hence the simpler formulation; note that 
delivery charges are incorporated into the costs of 
constructing and maintaining diversion facilities. 
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known probability density function f(x), 
no expected profit-maximizing firm would 
acquire a diversion facility with capacity in 
excess of its rights to use water; moreover, 
rights in excess of diversion capacity would 
not be approved by the state rights admin- 
istrator. Hence di can be identified as the 
appropriative rights of firm i. As a matter 
of notation, let 
Ai= Za 
j=1 
Then Ai denotes the aggregate amounts of 
claims to water senior to the claims of firm 
i + 1; alternatively, Ai is the total amount 
of diversion capacity owned (or leased) by 
firms 1 through i (Ao = 0). 
Identifying water rights with diversion 
capacities, the assignment of rights under 
the appropriative doctrine can be sum- 
marized in the vector (a I, i2, . *dN)g 
where there are N firms exploiting a stream. 
Expected profits for firm i, Ei7r, are then 
given by 
E'7r = F(Ai-j)r(Oqdi) 
+ IA' 7r(x - A i)/(x)dx 
+ [1 - F(A1)]7r(Ui,Ui) 
where -xi = -r for i = i, ..., N (all firms are 
identical) and F(c) = fCf(x)dx. Thus, firm 
i receives zero units of water if the stream- 
flow x is no more than enough to satisfy 
senior claimants; the probability that river 
flows do not exceed Ai_1 is F(Ai-1) while 
profits for the ith firm in this case are 
7r(O,ai), so that the expected value of this 
outcome is represented by the first term in 
the expression for expected profits. If the 
flow exceeds senior claims and can be 
handled by firm i's diversion capacity, then 
expected profits are given by the second 
term in this expression; that is, expected 
profits are r(x - Ai1,I1i) times f(x) 
summed over the interval of river flows 
which yield increasing amounts of water to 
the ith firm. If river flow exceeds the capac- 
ity of claimants 1 through i, then the ith 
firm receives its entire appropriation. The 
probability of this occurrence is 1 - F(A1) 
and ith firm profits are 7r(a7, Wj), hence the 
third term in the expression. 
II. Water Rights and Water Usage: 
Appropriative System 
Clearly, senior claimants obtain a pre- 
ferred position due to their priority in ac- 
cess to the streamflow. Let xi denote the 
flow available for use by firm i and let 
Gi(xi) denote the cumulative probability 
distribution over this flow. Then Gi(xi) is 
given by 
G'(O) = F(Ai-1) 
Gi(x - Ai-) = F(x), Ai-, < x < oo 
Since Aj > Ai for j > i, it follows that 
Gi(b) < Gi(b) for b >_ , j > i, with strict 
inequality for b > Ai-,, assuming f(x) > 
OforA._ ? x < Ai. 
Hence the probability distribution of 
streamflows facing a junior appropriator 
is stochastically dominated (in the sense of 
first-degree stochastic dominance) by the 
distribution facing any senior appropria- 
tor. Under the assumption of positive mar- 
ginal profitability of water use (7r1(ak) > 0 
for ak > 0, k = i, j) stochastic dominance 
implies that for any monotonically increas- 
ing measurable utility function U over 
profits, 
EGi U(T) > EGj U() 
for i < j (see Quirk and Rubin Saposnik or 
Josef Hadar and W. R. Russell). This re- 
sult can be summarized as follows: 
PROPOSITION 1: Under the appropriative 
doctrine, the probability distribution facing 
any senior appropriator is unambiguously 
preferred by any potential user of the water- 
way to that facing a junior appropriator. 
To analyze the consequences of the ap- 
propriative doctrine for the allocation of 
water among potential users, we consider 
the distribution of rights that would arise 
under stationary conditions, assuming free 
entry coupled with an absolute prohibition 
on the sale or transfer of water rights to 
other water users or alternative uses. Given 
that senior claims (-l, d2, ., Zii- ) exist, 
firm i chooses the diversion capacity -i 
which maximizes the expected utility of 
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profits. Assuming that firm i is risk neutral, 
expected utility maximization implies ex- 
pected profit maximization where 
Eir = F(Ai I)r(0, =i) 
+ AA Ir(x - Ai-,,ai)f(x)dx 
+ [1 - F(A1)]r(ai1Ji) 
Fora-i > Owe have 
dE'ir- dE7 = F(A i- I) r2 (0, a-X) dai 
+ fA i r2(X Ai-,,i) f(x)dx 
+ [1 - F(Ai){4r1(ai,ai) 
+ 7r2(ai,ai) = o 
Under separability of the profit function 
(ir 12= 0) we can write 7r1 (z, w) = 7r1 (z) and 
-r2(Z, W) = 7r2(w) and the first-order condi- 
tion reduces to 
r2(ai) + [1 - F(Ai)]7rj(i) = 0 
which we write as 
MM(O1) = 7r2(ai) 
+ [1 - F(Ai_1 + a1)]7r1(a-) = 0 
At a regular maximum of expected profits 
we have dMi(ai)/Odi < 0. Observing that 
(OMi(a )) = 
-r1(ai)f(A ) < 0 
aAil - aiconstant 
we have 
PROPOSITION 2: Given two expected 
profit-maximizingfirms with identical separ- 
able profit functions, the firm with senior 
rights claims a larger quantity of water (con- 
structs a larger diversion capacity) than does 
a firm with junior rights. 
The incentive rationale underlying Prop- 
osition 2 is obvious since senior firms face 
preferred probability distributions over 
streamflows relative to junior firms. Al- 
ready there is some indication of the alloca- 
tive inefficiency of the appropriative system 
in the absence of a competitive market for 
water rights. At an optimum, firms with 
identical production and profit functions 
should presumably divert and use identical 
amounts of water. The appropriative sys- 
tem biases the distribution of water use in 
favor of firms with earlier filing dates for 
water rights over firms filing later in time. 
Proposition 2 generalizes directly when 
firms are risk-averse expected utility maxi- 
mizers. If firms face different technologies, 
then the ordering of diversion capacities 
does not generalize. However, the intent of 
the proposition does. Fundamentally, the 
first-order conditions imply that with all 
firms operating in competitive output mar- 
kets, junior appropriators are more pro- 
ductive at the margin in the sense that the 
ratio of marginal revenue to marginal cost 
increases with decreasing seniority. If firms 
are identical, this implies that senior firms 
appropriate more water. 
An issue of some importance to alloca- 
tive efficiency of the appropriative doctrine 
is the extent to which the flow of a water- 
way is appropriated. To put it in other 
terms, how much diversion capacity is built 
under the system of appropriative rights, 
assuming each firm builds its own capacity? 
Let N denote the number of appropria- 
tors exploiting a waterway at a long-run 
competitive equilibrium so that the last firm 
just finds it worthwhile to appropriate a 
portion of the stream by building a diver- 
sion capacity. Assuming risk neutrality and 
separable profit functions for all firms, if 
the waterway is appropriated by N firms we 
have EN7r > 0 for aN > 0, EN+17r < 0 for 
aN+ I > 0, where 
72(aN) + [1 - F(AN)7rl(ZiN) = 0 
7r22(aN) f (AN)7r I (N) 
+ [1 - F(AN)]7rIl(UN) < 0 
From the first-order condition we have 
F(AN) = 1 + 7r2(aN) 
7r I( ) 
where 7r2(aN) < 0, 7r-(aI0) > 0 for all aN > 0. 
The entire stream is completely appropri- 
ated only ifUN 0 with 
lim 7rl(N) = + 
aN-0 
So long as ur, is bounded from above, the 
total amount of diversionary capacity 
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built is less than the maximum flow of the 
stream. 
Given a neoclassical production function 
and a competitive output market for the 
firm's product, then 
lim 7r1(aN) = + 
aN-o 
This does not necessarily guarantee a com- 
pletely appropriated stream, however. In 
fact, under extreme conditions of scale 
economies in diversion capacity 
lim 72(0N) = - 
aN-o 
We will assume that increasing returns 
"dominate" for small diversion capacities 
in the sense that 
lim -K2 (di)) >1 
iii -o X 1 (diX) 
Under such circumstances, the number of 
firms exploiting the stream is finite, with 
each firm of noninfinitesimal size. 
PROPOSITION 3: If increasing returns 
dominate for small diversion capacities and if 
the potential users of a stream are risk neu- 
tral with identical separable profit functions, 
then the aggregate amount of water rights 
(diversion capacity) at a long-run competi- 
tive equilibrium is less than the maximum 
flow of the stream; further, each appropria- 
tor is of noninfinitesimal size, and the number 
of appropriators is finite. 7 
COROLLARY: Under the conditions of 
Proposition 3, the expected value of stream- 
flows exceeds the expected value of diver- 
sions. 
III. Allocative Inefficiency of the 
Appropriative System 
Consider next a waterway operating in 
long-run competitive equilibrium, exploited 
by N risk-neutral firms with identical sep- 
arable profit functions, with water rights 
determined under the appropriative doc- 
trine. Suppose the conditions of Proposi- 
tion 3 hold, so that N is finite. Let (a,,.... 
aiN) denote the vector of diversion capacities 
for the N firms. Associated with this pat- 
tern of appropriations is a value of aggre- 
gate expected profits EA, given by 
N 
ElA = Z F(A )7 r(O, ai) 
+ i= _ 7r(x - I 
+ [1 - F(Ai)]7(ai,Ui)j 
Given A N the diversion capacity under the 
appropriative system, is the pattern of in- 
vestment in diversion capacity and use of 
water associated with the appropriative 
system efficient? The answer is that the 
appropriative system is not efficient. We 
establish this by showing that there exists 
a feasible alternative to the appropriative 
system, namely equal sharing, that pro- 
duces a higher value of output for every 
possible streamflow. 
Given the aggregate diversion capacity 
AN and given any streamflow x, then ag- 
gregate profits associated with an arbitrary 
feasible allocation of diversion capacities 
and water usage are given by 
N 
7r(a1,ai) where a, di, 
i = I 
N N 
fai ' x, Ea = AN 
It is immediate that with 7rll < 0, then so 
long as _r22 < 0 (marginal cost of adding 
diversion capacity is increasing), aggregate 
profits are maximized with ai = x/N for 
x < AN, ai = AN/N for x > AN, with i = 
AN/N for i = 1,..., N. In fact, writing ag- 
gregate profits as 
N N 
E 7r(ai,aj) = E {R(a1) - C(di)j 
i=1 i=I 7Proposition 3 generalizes even for nonidentical 
risk-averse expected utility maximizers facing diverse 
technologies. To see this observe that the last ap- 
propriator must be of noninfinitesimal size else the 
dominance of increasing returns for small diversion 
capacity is violated. Given this, complete appropria- 
tion of the river implies that the costs of constructing 
diversion capacity be negative at some level, a clear 
impossibility (see Appendix A). 
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it also follows that under equal sharing, ag- 
gregate revenue ,N I Ri(ai) is maximized 
and aggregate cost N/ I C(di) is minimized, 
subject to the feasibility constraints. Fi- 
nally, for N > 1, agg;ugate profits (and 
aggregate revenue) are clearly less under the 
appropriate system than under equal shar- 
ing, for any value of x, because of the 
ordering of capacities from Proposition 2. 
Assuming competitive input and output 
markets, the results in turn imply that 
Pareto optimality implies equal sharing, 
while the appropriative system is inefficient. 
PROPOSITION 4: Assume that N firms ex- 
ploit a waterway, with each firm having an 
identical separable profit function strictly 
concave in water usage. If the marginal cost 
of adding diversion capacity is increasing, 
then equal sharing is the efficient allocation 
of diversion capacity and water usage; alloca- 
tion under the appropriative system is in- 
efficient. 8 
The assumption that the marginal cost 
of adding diversion capacity is increasing 
at an equal sharing allocation is restrictive. 
As it turns out, when this assumption is 
relaxed to permit declining marginal costs 
of adding diversion capacity, then it can 
still be shown that the appropriative sys- 
tem is inefficient in the sense that expected 
profits under other feasible allocations ex- 
ceed those under the appropriative system. 
However, equal sharing is no longer neces- 
sarily the efficient allocation. Details are 
given in Appendix B. 
The source of the allocative inefficiencies 
of the appropriative system is unequal 
sharing of risk and diversion capacity 
among firms. The Coase theorem makes it 
clear that a solution to the problem in- 
volves the establishment of competitive 
markets in water rights. Let aij be thc frac- 
tion of firm i's rights that is purchased by 
firm j, and let f3ij be the fraction of firm i's 
diversion capacity leased to firm j; let pi be 
the price for a 1 percent share of firm i's 
water and let qi be the price for a 1 percent 
share of firm i's diversion capacity. Then 
given the investment vector Oil, * * *, aZ) 
established under the appropriative alloca- 
tion9 and assuming risk neutrality, with 
competitive markets in rights and capacity, 
each firm picks aij and 3ij so as to maximize 
expected profit-. At an equilibrium (see 
Appendix C for a complete derivation) with 
a = AN/N, we have 
(1) JA_I ir(-)(x - Ai-,) f(x)dx 
N 
r-+ L fAr-Ii I ( xUi f (x) dx 
+ [1 - F(AN]17r&(ii = pi + qi, 
i = I,.., N 
(2) qj/ij = qili i,j = 1,.. ., N 
Condition (1) can be written as 
() N Ai-, f (x)dx 
+ [1 - F(AN)]7rl() = 
pi/li + qi/ai 
In (2), qi > qj for i < j; the price for 1 per- 
cent of a senior firm's capacity exceeds that 
of a iunior firm, as the senior firm has 
largei .apacity; however, qilii = qj/lj for 
i, j = 1, .. ., N, so that price per unit of ca- 
pacity is equal among all firms. Since pi is 
the price for 1 percent of firm i's water 
rights, 100 x pi/li is the price of obtaining 
one unit of firm i's water when available by 
streamflow. Then the left-hand side of (1') 
(multiplied by 100) is the expected marginal 
8Proposition 4 generalizes as well. Note, however, 
that with diverse technologies, at the optimum water 
is prorated among firms according to their productiv- 
ity so the expected marginal profitability is zero across 
firms, a condition that implies equal sharing if firms 
are identical. 
9Should the eventuality of resale of water rights be 
foreseen, one might question the determinancy at the 
investment vector (a,, N): what prevents a senior 
appropriator from "over-appropriating" for possible 
future resale? Fortunately this poses no problem as the 
appropriative doctrine is clear on this matter: to ob- 
tain a right to water it must be diverted, and diver- 
sions are limited to beneficial consumptive use. How- 
ever in practice this may be problematic (see fn. 2). 
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profitability of a unit of water obtained 
from firm i, set equal to its marginal cost, 
including the increase in cost due to the 
added diversion capacity necessary to 
deliver the water. It is clear from (1) and 
(1') that i < j implies pi > pj and pi/ai > 
pj/dj, but at the equilibrium prices pi, i = 
1, . . ., N, purchasers of water are indifferent 
among suppliers at the margin. 
Clearly conditions (1) and (2) are consis- 
tent with market clearing. Hence an effi- 
cient mix of capacities and usages (equal 
sharing) can be attained under the appro- 
priative system, given competitive markets 
in water rights and diversion capacity and 
given a fixed diversion capacity. Thus we 
have 
PROPOSITION 5: Given that allfirms have 
identical separable profit functions and are 
risk neutral, and given that increasing re- 
turns dominate for small diversion capacities, 
the appropriative system of rights allocation 
coupled with competitive markets in rights 
and diversion facilities leads to an efficient 
outcome (namely, equal sharing), given the 
fixed aggregate installed diversionary capac- 
ity. The price per unit of water varies mono- 
tonically with the seniority of the water sup- 
plier; the price per unit of capacity is 
constant across firms. 10 
However, there are some problems with 
the conclusion of Proposition 5. Economies 
of scale in the delivery system for water are 
pervasive enough that it is difficult to main- 
tain a competitive environment in the mar- 
ket for diversionary facilities and hence in 
the market for water rights as well. In fact, 
it is this phenomeon that no doubt accounts 
for the creation of publicly controlled ir- 
rigation districts in the Southwest, designed 
to achieve the savings from scale while 
minimizing monopolistic distortions; and 
this also accounts for the (rarely enforced) 
acreage limitations on recipients of water 
from the Bureau of Reclamation projects. 
Admittedly, in principle monopoly distor- 
tions could also be eliminated through 
appropriate bribes, but excessive transac- 
tions costs impose impediments to such a 
policy. 
Proposition 5 takes as given the aggre- 
gate diversion capacity that is built under 
the appropriative system and asserts that 
competitive markets in rights and in leases 
of diversion facilities lead to an efficient 
outcome given that diversion capacity. This 
still leaves unanswered the issue of an opti- 
mal level of aggregate diversion capacity 
for a waterway. 
We begin by examining a variant of this 
problem. Suppose that each firm owns its 
own diversion facility, and that increasing 
returns dominate for small diversion capac- 
ities, with N firms exploiting a waterway in 
long-run equilibrium under the appropria- 
tive doctrine. Aggregate capacity is AN 
units. Consider in contrast the same N 
firms (all with identical separable profit 
functions) operating under equal sharing of 
water, with identical diversion capacities. 
What can be said about the amount of 
capacity that will be installed under equal 
sharing if aggregate expected profits are to 
be maximized? 
First-order conditions require that 
r2(aN) + [1 - F(AN)]larI(N) = 0 
for the appropriative scheme, while 
X2(a) + [1 - F(Nd)]ir1(Z!) = 0 
for the equal sharing scheme. Thus, 
F(AN) 1 + -2(aN) 
lrI (ax) 
and F(Nd) 1 + 2 
ur(a) 
F(AN) F(Nd) 2(_ )_ ir2() 
irI OiN) ir I 00 
We have irl > 0 for ai > 0, -2 < 0 for 
ij > 0. Further, assume that all firms oper- 
ate under nondecreasing marginal costs of 
diversion capacity; in particular a > aN 
implies ir2(a) < 7r2(aN)- 
Suppose that Na- > AN. Then 7r2(aN)/ 
7rIO(IN) - Ir2(a)/irI(a) < 0. But Na- > AN im- 
plies a > a-N for N > 1. Hence O < Irl (0) < 
10Proposition 5 generalizes in the same manner as 
Proposition 4. 
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7rI(aN) and 0 > Ir2(aN) > ir2(a) so that 
1r2(aN)/lr1(aN) - /r2(a)//r1(a) > 0, a con- 
tradiction. Hence Na < AN- 
PROPOSITION 6: Let N be the number of 
firms with identical separable profit functions 
exploiting a waterway in long-run equili- 
brium under the appropriative system. Then 
the aggregate diversion capacity constructed 
by these N firms exceeds that which would 
be constructed by the same firms under equal 
sharing, assuming that each firm builds its 
own diversion facility and that the marginal 
cost of constructing diversion facilities is 
increasing. " 
Thus there is a systematic overinvestment 
in diversion capacity under the appropria- 
tive scheme, assuming that the same N firms 
exploit a waterway under either equal shar- 
ing or the appropriative scheme, with each 
firm building its own diversion capacity. 
IV. A Diversion Capacity Industry 
It is clear, however, that with increasing 
returns operating with respect to diversion 
facilities, one would expect the develop- 
ment of an independent subindustry en- 
gaged in the construction and leasing of 
such facilities. As noted earlier, there are 
monopolistic problems present in such an 
industry; this has led to the formation of 
publicly operated and controlled irrigation 
districts which act in effect as lessors of 
diversion capacity. Suppose that the mo- 
nopoly problems are overcome so that 
there is competitive pricing of leases. Let 
C(a) denote the annualized cost associated 
with a diversion facility of capacity a. Then 
under long-run competitive conditions, the 
aggregate diversion capacity for a waterway 
would be equal to M0*, where M is the 
number of leasing firms and a* is the capac- 
ity owned by any one leasing firm, with 
C(a*)/a* = CI'(a*). That is, each leasing 
firm builds a capacity such that the average 
annualized cost per unit of capacity is mini- 
mized. Under competitive conditions, the 
charge for leasing a unit of capacity would 
then equal C'(d*). Thus lessees would face 
constant marginal costs of diversion facili- 
ties; i.e., ir2(a) = - C'(a-*) is a constant 
independent of a. 
Recall that under the appropriative 
scheme, 
r2(aN) + [I1 - F(A N)] r (IiN) = 0 
With a leasing industry operating under 
competitive conditions, we have ir2(aN) in- 
dependent of aN. Given that C'(a-*)(= - 
ir2(a)) is less than lima-0 7rj(a,a), it is clear 
that the "marginal" firm chooses a capac- 
ity that approaches zero as N + oo. (If 
C'(ii*) > lima-o 7rl(a), then no firm finds it 
profitable to exploit the waterway). It fol- 
lows that 
F(AN) = 1 _ C (a*) lim 7rl(a) 
a-0 
The same condition holds when aggre- 
gate expected profits are maximized, with 
all firms sharing equally in streamflows, 
since at a maximum of aggregate expected 
profits we have 
1r2(a) + [1 - F(Nd)] irI(i) = 0 
so that 
F(Na-) = 1 _ C(*) lim 7r1 (a) 
a-0 
Hence AN = Na. We summarize this as 
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose there is an 
arbitrary number of firms, all with identical 
separable profit functions, exploiting a water- 
way. In addition suppose there is a competi- 
tive industry in diversion capacity which 
leases capacity to rights holders, with each 
leasing firm building the capacity which 
minimizes the average annualized cost per 
unit of capacity. If entry is free and unob- 
structed in both the diversion capacity and 
water-using industries, then in long-run 
equilibrium aggregate investment is the same 
IIProposition 6 relies heavily on separability of the 
profit function. Although the proof is less direct the 
result generalizes for diverse technologies (maintaining 
the separability assumption) but not for risk averters. 
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under either the appropriative or equal shar- 
ing systems. 12 
Hence, the establishment of a competitive 
leasing industry that takes full advantage 
of the economics of scale in diversion facili- 
ties leads to the same aggregate diversion 
capacities under the appropriative scheme 
as under equal sharing.'3 
From Proposition 4 we know that for 
any given diversion capacity, equal sharing 
is the efficient solution given competitive 
markets with aggregate profits and revenue 
larger for any value of stream flows x than 
under the appropriative system. Thus with 
a competitive leasing industry operating to 
capture the limited economies of scale in 
building diversion capacity, equal sharing 
is a necessary condition for Pareto optimal- 
ity, and involves the same aggregate diver- 
sion capacity as the appropriative system. 
Finally, the equal sharing allocation can be 
achieved under an appropriative system by 
competitive markets in water rights, from 
Proposition 5. By employing l'Hospital's 
rule we have 
lim NR (a) aRI(0) 
N-- N 
so that the aggregate revenue function for 
equal sharing is continuous at the origin. 
By a limiting argument we have 
PROPOSITION 8: Under the conditions of 
Proposition 7, at a long-run equilibrium 
equal sharing is a necessary condition for 
Pareto optimality and equal sharing can be 
achieved under an appropriative system 
through competitive markets in water rights. 
The appropriative system possesses one 
fundamental advantage over the riparian 
system or the equal sharing of rights in that 
it provides tenure certainty for each rights 
holder: rights holders are in principle pro- 
tected against loss of their rights through 
the legal actions of others. While the ap- 
pearance of a new claimant to water can 
dilute the privileges of existing water users 
under either the riparian or equal sharing 
systems, the principle of "first in time 
means first in right" protects the privileges 
of existing users under the appropriative 
system. 
Unfortunately in practice tenure cer- 
tainty is difficult to guarantee even under 
the appropriative system. Due to spatial 
dispersion of appropriators, informational 
inadequacies and random elements (such as 
variability in return flows), it is often diffi- 
cult to determine whether a diminished 
downstream flow to senior appropriators is 
the result of the stochastic nature of river 
flows or the improper actions of upstream 
junior appropriators. And, as we have seen, 
the principle of tenure certainty is bought 
at the cost of economic efficiency, so long 
as water rights are not freely transferable. 
Limitations on the transferability of 
water exist in the form of federal and state 
statutes, and interregional and interstate 
compacts. Moreover, there are other im- 
pediments to transfers: fixed diversion 
capacities, transactions costs, and exter- 
nalities. Externalities arise because a change 
in the nature or location of water diversions 
can affect return flows to a river and hence 
can impinge on the established water rights 
of third parties. Thus there are sound eco- 
nomic grounds for certain of the existing 
limitations on rights transfers. 
However, we would argue that consider- 
able potential latitude for the transfer of 
water rights still exists, and that economic 
efficiency could be improved by weakening 
existing legal constraints on such transfers. 
The usual argument in favor of transferable 
water rights identifies the higher productiv- 
ity of water in industrial or municipal use 
as compared to present usage which is 
highly concentrated in irrigated farming. 
While we certainly agree with this argu- 
ment, our conclusion goes even further: 
even among identical firms producing iden- 
tical products, freely transferable water 
rights leads to increased economic effi- 
ciency. 
12This result generalizes directly for diverse tech- 
nologies and risk-averse expected utility maximizers. 
'3Although Proposition 7 is instructive, one would 
not expect it to be operational in the real world be- 
cause of spatial monopolies in the diversion leasing 
industry. 
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Our approach in this paper has centered 
on the simple case of a static long-run com- 
petitive equilibrium with an uncontrolled 
river. We have not attempted to model the 
dynamics of the process by which rights are 
acquired and implemented under the ap- 
propriative system, nor have we examined 
the special problems that arise when a 
reservoir system is constructed with releases 
to downstream users being determined in 
an optimal fashion, subject to the priorities 
that hold under the appropriative system of 
rights.'4 It is clear to us, however, that 
whatever are the complexities introduced 
into the analysis by these factors, there are 
still advantages that can be gained by widen- 
ing the possibilities for transferability of 
water rights. 
APPENDIX A 
Proposition 3 generalizes immediately for 
nonidentical firms as no comparisons are 
made across firms. The result generalizes as 
well for risk-averse producers -in fact even 
for nonidentical firms with nonidentical 
utility functions, given monotone preferences 
and risk aversion. 
To see this first observe that first-order 
conditions for expected utility maximiza- 
tion require that 
E'u(7ri) o 0 = F(A i- )U'[7(O,a-)]72ra) 
daiI 
) ) 
+ fA u [r(x - A i 2 a 
+ [1 - F(Ai)]u'a[ir'(-i`Ji)] 
[.7ril(ai) + 7ri(J I)] 
subject to E'u(ir) > u(O). Suppose the last 
appropriator chooses capacity a N = 0, 
satisfying the first-order condition as an 
equality. Then for any u, monotonic and 
concave, the first-order condition becomes 
lim $T2 (UN) + [1 - N)] I (N) = 0 
aN-O 
This conflicts with the assumption that in- 
creasing returns dominates for small diver- 
sion capacities. Hence aN is noninfinitesimal 
and N is finite. If the entire river is ap- 
propriated these first-order conditions be- 
come 
F(A N-) UI [7rN(O, NN)] 7r2(aN) 
+f"AN U [,rN(X - A -I9a) fN-1 AN-1, N)] 
7r 2 (N)f (x)dx = 0 
which is impossible in view of the negativity 
of 1r2. Hence the river is not fully appro- 
priated. 
APPENDIX B 
Consider an arbitrary reassignment of di- 
version capacities and water rights among 
the N firms such that firm j receives fj per- 
cent of AN as its diversion capacity along 
with aij percent of any streamflow within 
the range A i- I to A i where 
N 
fj ? 0, j= 1, aij , 0, 
j=I 
N 
E aij = , i,j =19 N 
j=1 
Leta = [aoijl], = [fj] and let E(a,f ) be the 
expected value of aggregate profits, where 
E(a,f) = I {ZL 7A ir[aij(x - Ai-,) 
i- I 
+ E akjak ,jAAN]f(x)dx 
k=1 
+ [1 - F(AN)]T7r(1jAN9jIAN)1 
Thus E(afl) = E(Z,V9) = LA for fj = aj IAN, 
j= 19 = 0, i 5 j, i, j = 1, .. ., N 
N 
Let L = E(a,fl) + - zE ,i) 
Ji= I 
N N 
+ Z (i - L a i) 
i=l j=1 
At a constrained maximum of E(a,fl) we 
have 
dE(a,fl) - < 0 r = 1,. N 
OfOr 
(< 0 implies fr = 0) 
14See the authors (1977) for a simplified treatment 
of the problem of reservoir management under the 
appropriative system. 
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&E(a,/3)M_ ?O <  s, r N1, **N 
aasr 
(<0 implies asr= 0) 
where, given 7r12 = O, 
a E(a,/3) AN1ir2(0,AN) 
+ [1 - F(AN)]wI(13rAN)1 r = 1,... .,N 
dE(a,/) = fAs I[[a5sr(X -As-) 
sr 
s I 
+ Z akriak] (X - A 5 1) f (x)dx k = I 
N A 
+E Z A Irt[(alr(X - A,I) 
t=s+ 
t - I 
+ Z aAsak]fas(x)dX 
k = I 
r,s = N 
The question we pose is whether the ap- 
propriative system (N, X) qualifies as a can- 
didate for a maximizer of E(a, 3). Evaluate 
the expression immediately above at ass = 1, 
asr 0=, s r, 3r = /AN r, s=,...,N 
so that, for s = 1, ... . N, 
aE(a, l) = jAAs w,(x- As-,) 
- (x A s ,1) f (x)dx + JAN Ir(s) 
*71sf(x)dx = u5, since a55 > 0; 
a E(a,f) 
=A As ir (0)(x - As 1) f (x)dx 
+a r s I At-I I()a (xd 
r JA I Ar1( -I a xd + A 7r ir I (0)df(x) dx t=s+ I - 
+ LAr-1( Ari)Odsf (X)dX 
+AN r rI(01r) Z,f (X)dX ?< AS 
for r > s 
But r > s, E(zi,j) - EA implies a-r < dS by 
Proposition 2, and ir(a1) decreasing in ai 
implies on a term-by-term basis that 
aE((a, f) aE(a, f) 
a asr aass 
This contradicts the first-order conditions, 
hence the appropriative allocation is non- 
optimal. 
APPENDIX C 
Given competitive markets in water rights 
and diversion facilities, each firm solves the 
problem 
max Ei= r i-r[aij(x Ai-,) 
+ z akjak, QjI f (x)dx 
k = I 
N 
+ [1 - F(AN)]l r(Z Ikiak,aj) 
N 
+ Pj - Z pia,j 
i=I 
N 
+ qj - Z qiij 
N N 
subject to E aa < Z fliji 
i=l i=1 
with first-order conditions 
d Ejlr Ai, 
fA irl[aj(x Ai - ,) 
+ Z JA r- I[arj(X - Ari I) 
r- I 
+ Z afj k aji f (x)dX 
k = I 
- Pi - xidi = 0 
for aqi > 0, = N 
E. 
= [1 - F(AN)] 
N 
1( tkjak)ai - qi + jii= 0 
for iIj > 0, i = 1,...,N, where Xi is the 
multiplier associated with the constraint 
i=I aiji ?< I3ijdi. Note that the al- 
location aij = fij = 1/N i, j = 1,..., N 
which maximizes IN I Ej-x also satisfies the 
first-order conditions for any j, given that 
pi and qi satisfy equations (1) and (2) of the 
main text. 
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